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INFO RUFHST/US DEL SALT TWO-I 328

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T O P S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 5423

EXDIS

SALT

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION INFO ADDED)

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SUBJ: SALT: NAC CONSULTATION OF DECEMBER 15

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR FARLEY CONSULTED WITH NAC ON SALT TWO DECEMBER 15. COUNCIL DISCUSSION ALSO COVERED THREE PAPERS PRIMARILY DEALING WITH FBS QUESTION CONTRIBUTED BY FRG, NETHERLANDS AND UK. COUNCIL WELCOMED PROPOSED STRONG US REBUTTAL OF SOVIET FBS POSITION. CONSENSUS WAS AGAINST NEGOTIATING FBS LIMITS IN SALT, AND IN FAVOR OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA APPROACH ON FBS, WITH STRONG DESIRE FOR CONSULTATIONS BEFORE US TABLES ANY NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULATION WITH SOVIETS. TO AID CONSULTATION PROCESS, SYG IS TO PREPARE SUMMARY PAPER ON FBS FOR COUNCIL DISCUSSION IN JANUARY. END SUMMARY

2. AMBASSADOR FARLEY CONSULTED WITH THE COUNCIL DECEMBER 15 ON SALT TWO-I TO DATE. IN ADDITION TO DELIVERING PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTIEL), HE SAID US INTENDED IN FINAL WEEK OF CURRENT SALT SESSION TO MAKE ANOTHER FORCEFUL REBUTTAL OF SOVIET POSITION ON FBS. US WILL STRESS THAT KEY AND CENTRAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE ARE ICBMS,

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SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS. ALTHOUGH EACH SIDE POSSESSES A NUMBER OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS, IT IS THESE THREE CENTRAL SYSTEMS ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CENTER SINCE THEY PLAY THE MAJOR ROLE IN DETERMINING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. US DOES NOT ACCEPT A CONTRIVED DEFINITION OF THE WORD "STRATEGIC" WHICH WOULD BE TO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET SIDE. US REBUTTAL WILL NOTE THAT THE ASYMMETRIES IN NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS THAT AFFECT THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE US AND USSR DO NOT FAVOR ONE SIDE. THERE ARE DISPARITIES IN MR/IRBMS, O SLCMS AND MEDIUM BOMBERS. THESE SYSTEMS ARE RELEVANT IN THE CONTEXT OF RESPECTIVE CAPABILITIES OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. US WILL NOTE THAT ITS TACTICAL AVIATION AND TACTICAL MISSILE FORCES ARE DEPLOYED AS INTEGRAL ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY FORCES WHICH SUPPORT OUR ALLIANCES. SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCES WHILE NOT DEALING WITH FACTORS WHICH NECESSITATE OUR DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES AND DEPLOYMENT US FORCES AT SEA AND ABROAD. US WILL TELL THE SOVIETS THAT WE WILL NOT CONSIDER IN OUR SALT DISCUSSIONS LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES OR OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT US OBLIGATIONS TO ITS ALLIANCES.

3. THOMSON (UK) SAID HIS DELEGATION'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28 WAS THE MORE RELEVANT IN LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR FARLEY'S PRESENT REPORT. THIS REPORT AND THE FRG, NETHERLANDS, AND UK PAPERS ALL DEALT WITH THE FBS ISSUE. THE ALLIES AGREED THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE TO EXCLUDE FBS FROM SALT AND TO DISPOSE OF THE ISSUE WITHOUT UNDERTAKING ANY CORRESPONDING COMMITMENTS, BUT IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE MATTER. UK HAD CONCLUDED THAT ON BALANCE IT WAS UNDESIRABLE TO ATTEMPT TO REMOVE FBS FROM SALT BY PROPOSING TO DISCUSS IT IN MBFR. THIS WOULD IMPLY READINESS TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS OF THESE US SYSTEMS. ALSO, SOVIET MR/IRBMS WERE OUT OF PROSPECTIVE MBFR REDUCTION AREA. FINALLY, SUBJECT OF DUAL-ROLE AIRCRAFT MIGHT THUS ARISE TOO SOON IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THUS UPSET PREFERRED MBFR NEGOTIATING TIMETABLE. THE UK ACCEPTED THAT MBFR WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, BUT IT DID NOT WANT TO PREJUDICE ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THOMSON CONTINUED THAT GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA WOULD PROBABLY BEST MEET THE DESIDERATA LISTED IN THE UK LETTER. HOWEVER, NEED GUARD AGAINST SOVIETS INVOKING SUCH A FORMULA TO COMPLAIN ABOUT TEMPORARY REINFORCEMENTS, AND COMBINED WITH A

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NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE COULD COMPLICATE US PROVISION OF CERTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO THE ALLIES. ADVANTAGES OF GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULATION WOULD BE THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON FBS, BUT THAT THE US COULD CHALLENGE THE SOVIETS ON A BUILDUP IN THEIR MR/IRBMS AND MEDIUM BOMBERS.

5. TO GO BEYOND A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA TO A SPECIFIED FREEZE COULD BE UNDESIRABLE, SINCE THIS WOULD INVOLVE DEFINING NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND COULD INVOLVE RESTRAINTS ON FORCES US PROVIDED FOR THE ALLIANCE. ALSO, SOVIETS COULD TRY TO EXTEND A FREEZE TO THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF OTHER ALLIES. THOMSON CONCLUDED THAT CONSULTATION ON FBS QUESTION WOULD BE MOST IMPORTANT, AND THERE SHOULD BE PRIOR DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL OF ANY FORMULATION FOR DEALING WITH FBS BEFORE SUBMITTING IT TO SOVIETS.

6. BOSS (FRG) SAID THE PRESENT US REPORT ON SALT SHOWED THAT ITS VIEWS COINCIDED WITH MANY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE COUNCIL. NETHERLANDS, UK AND FRG HAD CONTRIBUTED PAPERS WHICH COMPLEMENTED ONE ANOTHER. UK HAD LISTED DESIDERATA WHICH A SOLUTION OF THE FBS QUESTION SHOULD MEET, BUT THERE

WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT NO "PACKAGES" OF CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE PUT TOGETHER NOW. THE FRG AGREED THAT FBS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM SALT, AND SUPPORTED A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA TO THIS END. REFERRING TO THE DUTCH PAPER CONTAINING ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUDING FBS IN SALT, BOSS SUGGESTED THAT GEOGRAPHICAL AND NPT ARGUMENTS MIGHT BE ADDED.

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TOP SECRET SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 5423

EXDIS

SALT

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SUBJ: SALT: NAC CONSULTATION OF DECEMBER 15

7. SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS) WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UK STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS CAUTION IN CONSIDERATION OF AN MBFR APPROACH TO FBS. AMBASSADOR FARLEY HAD REPORTED THAT SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS IN SALT INVOLVED A MAXIMALIST APPROACH. CONCERNING GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH, SPIERENBURG WONDERED "BLUNTLY" IF THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO PRESENT ANY PROPOSED LANGUAGE TO THE ALLIANCE FOR ITS "AGREEMENT", BEFORE TABLING SUCH LANGUAGE AT GENEVA.

8. CATALANO (ITALY) OBSERVED THERE WERE SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS IN SALT TWO, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS FBS. ITALY WELCOMED THE THREE ALLIED PAPERS AS A FIRST EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. THE PAPERS CONFIRMED HIS CONVICTION THAT IT

WAS ESSENTIAL FOR FBS TO BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE AND NOT BE WEAKENED. THIS US CONTRIBUTION WAS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN LIGHT OF PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SALT AGREEMENTS. CATALANO ALSO SUPPORTED GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH. IT SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE, COULD BE APPLIED TO SOVIET MR/IRBMS AND MEDIUM BOMBERS, BUT SHOULD INVOLVE NO ALLIED FORCES. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE ALLIANCE

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CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT, CATALANO ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PREPARE A RESUME PAPER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL EARLY NEXT YEAR. SYG LUNS AGREED.

9. DE ROSE (FRANCE) AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PUTTING FORWARD MAXIMAL POSITIONS. BY ITS APPROACH TO FBS, THE USSR WAS WRONGLY ATTEMPTING TO PLACE ITS TERRITORY AND THAT OF THE US IN A SPECIAL POSITION. SPECIFICALLY CONCERNING AN OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT, DE ROSE ASKED IF THE UNDERLYING THOUGHT WOULD BE THE SAME AS THAT OF THE ABM TREATY: TO PROTECT AGAINST THE DANGER OF DESTABILIZATION EITHER BY AN IMBALANCE BETWEEN FORCES OR SOME TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH. WOULD PERMITTED OFFENSIVE ARMS BE DESCRIBED AND LIMITED, AND ALL OTHER WEAPONS BE BANNED? WOULD THERE BE LIMITATIONS ON OTHER WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS THAN THROW WEIGHT? WHICH CHARACTERISTICS COULD BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL MEANS? WOULD THERE BE A LIMIT ON TOTAL THROW WEIGHT OR ON THAT OF INDIVIDUAL DELIVERY VEHICLES?

10. HJORTH-NIELSEN (DENMARK) WAS REASSURED BY THE US REPORT AND PLANNED REBUTTAL OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON FBS. MAXIMALIST SOVIET APPROACH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT REASSURING. THE THREE ALLIED PAPERS HAD HIGHLIGHTED IMPORTANCE OF FBS TO THE EAST-WEST BALANCE. HE WELCOMED THE US POSITION THAT FBS SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF THE AGREEMENT, IF POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD FOLLOW THIS LINE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET PRICE FOR EXCLUDING FBS MIGHT BE TOO HIGH, OR THEY MIGHT REFUSE TO REACH AN OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT DEALING WITH FBS. NATO SHOULD STUDY THE GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH, AND IT SHOULD BE PUT TO THE SOVIETS AT SOME STAGE. AS TO LANGUAGE FOR THE GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA, THE SOVIETS WOULD ASK US TO LIST THE CRITERIA FOR DECIDING WHEN A CIRCUMVENTION HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER THIS QUESTION. HJORTH-NIELSEN ALSO WONDERED WHAT SANCTIONS THERE WOULD BE IF A CIRCUMVENTION DID TAKE PLACE. HE HOPED FOR A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ALL THE IMPLICATIONS OF A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA BEFORE THE US PUT IT TO THE USSR.

11. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) REFERRED TO SPIERENBURG'S COMMENTS AND NOTED GREAT DIFFERENCES IN THE MENTALITIES OF EAST AND WEST. THE SOVIETS ASK THE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THE WEST IS IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION BECAUSE OF ITS PUBLIC OPINION. PERHAPS THE WEST SHOULD TAKE MAXIMAL POSITIONS AS WELL. REFERRING TO THE ALLIED PAPERS, DE STAERCKE SAID THAT FBS SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED IN

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MBFR. FBS SYSTEMS WERE PART OF THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF DETERRENCE, NOT LIMITED TO THE MBFR GEOGRAPHICAL REGION. IF FBS WERE NEGOTIATED IN MBFR IT WOULD BE NECESSARY GREATLY TO WIDEN MBFR PARTICIPATION. AS TO SPIERENBURG'S SUGGESTION OF SEEKING ALLIED AGREEMENT REPEAT AGREEMENT ON GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA BEFORE PRESENTATION TO THE SOVIETS, DE STAERCKE AGREED THAT FBS WAS OF SUCH CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEANS THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE A SAY. HE SUGGESTED THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF CONSULTATION OR COORDINATION ON FBS SIMILAR TO THE MBFR CONCEPT OF "DISCUSSION LEADING TO AGREEMENT". A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE SO AS TO ALLOW FOR "CRISIS MANAGEMENT" (AUGMENTATION). DE STAERCKE WONDERED HOW A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT WOULD BE VERIFIED.

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T O P S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 5423

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SALT

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SUBJ: SALT: NAC CONSULTATION OF DECEMBER 15

12. TULUMEN (TURKEY) SAID THAT FBS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN SALT OR MBFR. HE WAS GLAD THE US HAD REAFFIRMED ITS POSITION. THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THERE SHOULD BE NO TRADEOFF OF FBS-MR/IRBM INCLUSION IN LIMITATIONS, AS THIS WOULD BE TO DISADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIANCE. A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA ALONG THE LINES THE US WAS THINKING OF WAS POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE FBS QUESTION, BUT PRIOR FULL ALLIANCE CONSULTATION REQUIRED.

13. MENZIES (CANADA) WELCOMED US REPORT ON SALT TWO AND THE THREE ALLIED PAPERS. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME HAVING A "LEXICON" TO HELP HIS UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNICAL SALT TERMS SUCH AS "NON-CENTRAL". SYG LUNS AGREED.

14. FARLEY INDICATED HIS COMMENTS WOULD NOT COVER EVERY POINT MADE IN THE COUNCIL, BUT THESE WOULD BE NOTED AND REPORTED TO WASHINGTON. HE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOT BY CHANCE IF US VIEWS REGARDING FBS COINCIDED CLOSELY WITH THOSE OF THE OTHER ALLIES, SINCE WE HAD HAD THE BENEFIT OF ALLIED VIEWS AND PAPERS IN PREPARING OUR POSITION AND STATEMENTS. THE US WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH MANY OF THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH IN THE

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THREE ALLIED PAPERS. WE HAD PARTICULARLY NOTED THE UK SIVEWS, AS SUPPORTED BY BELGIUM ON RELATION TO MBFR. THE ANALYSIS OF THE GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH IN THE UK PAPER WAS SIMILAR TO US THINKING.

15. RESPONDING TO HJORTH-NIELSEN, FARLEY SAID US BELIEVED A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA WOULD PUT THE BURDEN ON A CHALLENGING COUNTRY TO SHOW THAT CIRCUMVENTION HAD IN FACT TAKEN PLACE. ALSO, WE WOULD WANT THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY TO COVER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS ROTATION OF AIRCRAFT IN CONNECTION WITH NORMAL EXERCISES. AS TO SANCTIONS, THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE NONE OTHER THAN POLITICAL PRESSURE AND ULTIMATE RECOURSE TO THE RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AGREEMENT.

16. FARLEY AGREED WITH FRG THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO LOOK AT FBS CONCESSIONS OR POSSIBLE TRADEOFF PACKAGES. FIRST, WE BELIEVE OUR POSITION ON FBS IS CORRECT AND REASONABLE.

SECOND, OUR POSITION IS FIRMLY IN ACCORD WITH OUR INTERESTS. THIRD, IF WE GAVE AN INDICATION OF NEGOTIABILITY, THIS WOULD RAISE QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY AND SOLIDITY OF OUR POSITION. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO STUDY THE FBS QUESTION FULLY UNTIL WE KNEW LIKELY ELEMENTS OF AN OVERALL OFFENSIVE LIMITATIONS AGREEMENT.

17. IN RESPONSE TO SPIERENBURG'S REQUEST FOR PRIOR COUNCIL APPROVAL OF A GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA, FARLEY THOUGHT THAT SPIERENBURG WOULD BE SATISFIED AS REGARDS CONSULTATION. FARLEY RECALLED THAT BEFORE MAY 1971, AGREEMENT TO SET ASIDE THE FBS ISSUE FOR THE TIME BEING, THE US HAD BEGUN TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE FORMULATIONS REGARDING FBS WITH THE COUNCIL. REGARDING TACTICS, IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING WAYS OF DEALING WITH FBS ISSUE BEFORE WE KNEW THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGICALLY SOUND OVERALL AGREEMENT. OTHERWISE, WE MIGHT RISK NEGOTIATING ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET POSITION RATHER THAN OUR OWN.

18. FARLEY AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD PUT FORWARD MAXIMAL POSITIONS, BUT HE DID NOT THINK THIS MADE THINGS AS DIFFICULT AS SOME HAD SUGGESTED. THIS WAS A FAMILIAR SOVIET TACTIC. WE HAVE ENOUGH EXPERIENCE NEGOTIATING WITH THEM TO KNOW THAT WE SHOULD START FROM OUR OWN POSITIONS.

19. REGARDING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL SIMPLY TO ADD OTHER ELEMENTS

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IN AN OFFENSIVE TREATY TO THE SLBM AND ICBM ELEMENTS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, FARLEY DID NOT THINK THE SOVIETS REALLY EXPECTED THIS. IT WAS TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT REFLECTS THE EXISTING SITUATION. FARLEY ALSO NOTED THAT IN SALT TWO, THE US WAS PROPOSING THAT THE SOVIETS REDUCE THEIR PRESENT THROW WEIGHT BY HALF. WE BELIEVE THIS IS A SOUND IDEA STRATEGICALLY, BUT IT MAY STRIKE THE SOVIETS AS MAXIMALIST. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SOVIET TACTICS HAVE PUT US IN A DIFFICULT POSITION.

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T O P S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 5423

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20. FARLEY CONTINUED THAT THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION HAD NOT YET COME UP, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RAISE IT. OUR VIEWPOINT IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT AGREE ON THIS POSITION UNTIL THE MAIN LINES OF AN AGREEMENT ARE WORKED OUT. WE WILL REPEAT THAT THE ABM TREATY NON-TRANSFER PROVISIONS ARE NOT A PRECEDENT TO AN OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT. SINCE THIS SUBJECT WAS ALSO OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE ALLIES, THE US INTENDS TO CONSULT CLOSELY.

21. IN REPLY TO DEROSE, FARLEY SAID THE AIM OF AN OFFENSIVE TREATY WOULD BE TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERALL DETERRENT BY CONTRIBUTING TO STRATEGIC STABILITY. BUT STABILITY WAS NOT THE ONLY CONSIDERATION. THERE WAS ALSO THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATION THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EQUAL BOTH IN FACT AND IN APPEARANCE. WE SH TO SET AS LOW A LEVEL AS POSSIBLE ON TOTAL FORCES, SO WE HAVE ARGUED FOR REDUCTIONS. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE WAS DIFFICULT TO HANDLE. ON THE ONE HAND, DESTABILIZING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO LIMIT, BUT THIS IS DIFFICULT AND RISKY. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME DEGREE OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT IS NECESSARY,

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AND DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN THE TWO IS HARD TO DO.

22. AS TO DE ROSE'S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, LIMITATIONS WE SOUGHT WERE BASICALLY QUANTITATIVE, BUT WE WERE LOOKING ALSO AT QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, THROW WEIGHT BEING THE ONE WE HAVE ACTUALLY ADVANCED. THE LIMITATIONS APPROPRIATE WOULD VARY WITH THE WEAPONS SYSTEM. ON VERIFIABILITY, WE WOULD USE ALL TECHNICAL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL, NOT JUST AS REGARDS SYSTEMS ALREADY DEPLOYED BUT ALSO THE TESTING OF NEW SYSTEMS. LIMITATIONS WOULD BE ON TOTAL THROW WEIGHT. THE QUESTION OF AN OFFENSIVE TREATY WAS MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN WAS THE ABM TREATY. WE MAY SPECIFY SOME LIMITATIONS, BAN OTHER SYSTEMS, AND ALLOW OTHERS TO BE BUILT (WITHIN OVERALL LIMITS).

23. SPIERENBURG RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS BY SAYING THAT DE STAERCKE'S CONCEPT (PARA 11) WOULD BE SATISFACTORY.

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